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Kingdom 1970s seconding banking crisis, the saving and 
loan default of 1980s in the United States, 1998 Russia finan-
cial crisis, Asia 1997–1998 financial crisis, the 2008 global 
financial crisis, recently the Brexit uncertainties, US trade-
war with China and presidential policies, have triggered the 
concurrent development of corporate governance structure 
globally. All these have necessitated the importance of cor-
porate governance for global sustainability and prosperity 
(Pillai and Al-Malkawi 2017).
Similar to other developing economies, financial institu-
tions tend to play an imperative role in Nigeria. Therefore, it 
is necessary to evaluate the extent of financial institutions’ 
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Abstract. This paper extends the prior studies on corporate performance by empirically exploring the impact of overall corporate 
governance structure on firm performance.  To unveil the objective of this study, firstly corporate governance index is built using 
Principal Component Analysis with 6 (six) identified corporate governance mechanisms from prior studies and then examines its 
effect on firms’ performance. This study draws a sample of twenty-four (24) financial companies from the listed financial institu-
tions in Nigeria for the period of 2013–2017. The formulated hypotheses are tested by employing static panel data estimators that 
are Fixed effect and Random Effect Regression. The results reveal that while controlling for firms’ characteristics, constructed 
corporate governance indicator has a significant and negative influence on the firm performance measured by Return on Asset 
and Return on Equity. This finding supports that larger board, larger board committees and significant executive involvement 
have a detrimental influence on the performance of firms. The result implies a weak corporate governance structure is detrimental 
to higher financial performance amidst the weak institutions characterized in Nigeria context. That is, weaker corporate gov-
ernance exhibits lower financial performance. This study then recommends that the corporate governance structure in Nigeria 
listed firms should be review with the intention to enhance the firm performance. Furthermore, it encourages the regulatory 
agencies like Central Bank of Nigeria, National Insurance Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission, to monitor 
the compliance of the listed firms to good governance endeavour.  
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Introduction 
This paper extends the prior studies on corporate perfor-
mance by empirically exploring the impact of overall corpo-
rate governance structure on firm performance. Corporate 
governance dynamism has evolved over the years with the 
response to prior corporate failures and crises (Ojeka et al. 
2015). According to the World Bank Report, the first well-
documented corporate governance failure can be traced to 
the “South Sea Bubble” of the 1700s, which transformed 
England’s business practices and laws. Equivalently, the stock 
market crisis of 1929 revolutionized the securities laws of 
the United States. In addition, further crises such as United 
contributions to the growing economies. Developing coun-
tries are characterized by weak institutions in which ad-
opted corporate governance structure may be voluntary 
with limited benefits (Adegbite 2015a, Love and Rachinsky 
2015). In the Nigeria context, the weak institution makes 
corporate law enforcement and self-regulatory initiative a 
mirage (Adegbite 2015a, Ojeka et al. 2019). In addition, 
Nigeria provides empirical insight due to the individual-
ity of its corporate governance structure compared to the 
Anglo-American system, which is frequently researched by 
scholars. For instance, the corporate governance structure is 
often developed by the founding families who tend to main-
tain control on boards and the executive teams. This study 
then examines the level of corporate governance structure 
on the performance of firms amidst the weak institutions 
in Nigeria context.
Globally, good corporate governance as a fundamental 
principle is recognized to sustain the firms’ performance, 
which has increasingly gained the interest of researchers, 
academic and practitioners. Interestingly, a strand of prior 
studies has examined different corporate governance indi-
cators on performance of firms in both developed and devel-
oping countries (Ahmed and Hamdan 2015, Detthamrong 
et al. 2017, Ducassy and Guyot 2017, Emile et al. 2014, 
Huang and Kang 2017a, 2017b). Those studies exhibit 
mixed conclusions. Studies such as Caprio et al. (2007), 
Cornett et al. (2009), Rezaee (2008) emphasize that frailer 
corporate governance can negatively influence the firms’ 
performance, valuation and may exhibit aggressive earning 
management characteristics. In addition, firms with weak 
governance characteristics may fail to embark on incen-
tives that could enhance shareholders wealth (Diamond 
and Rajan 2008). However, prior studies also confirm that 
strong corporate governance is allied with higher financial 
performance such as Tobin’s Q, return on asset (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) (Zagorchev and Gao 2015, Akhigbe 
and Martin 2008). 
Notably, prior studies examining the extent of diverse 
corporate governance mechanisms on both accounting 
and economic measures have inconsistent results. Larcker 
et al. (2007) affirm that the mixed results might be attrib-
utable to exertion in obtaining consistent measures for 
corporate governance construct. For instance, Yermack 
(1996) suggests a large board size diminishes the financial 
performance of firms while Dalton et al. (1999), uphold 
that large board composition enables the firm to attract 
more expertise skills and available resources. Therefore, it 
is necessary to measure corporate governance system with 
a reliable construct. Similarly, prior studies have introduced 
diverse corporate governance proxies into their method-
ology, which could increase explanatory power but might 
constitute statistical inconsistency (Tarchouna et al. 2017a). 
The statistical problems occur due to complementarily in-
teraction between corporate governance measurements 
(Ameziane Lasfer 2006, Florackis 2006). Consequently, 
the complementary relations amidst the corporate gover-
nance proxies could overload the model, which influence 
its reliability and limit researchers’ conclusion (Tarchouna 
et al. 2017a).  
To overcome the identified problems, prior studies 
have suggested the construction of a single mechanism 
that depicts the overall corporate governance structure. 
The linear correlation between various corporate gover-
nance constructs can be condensed to a unique index rep-
resenting the overall corporate governance system since 
the mechanisms are implemented to address the agency 
problems (Allen et al. 2018, Lakshan and Wijekoon 2012, 
Matei and Drumasu 2015, Qian and Yeung 2015). Hence, 
the developed corporate governance index focuses on the 
overall mechanism, which mitigates agency problems. 
While effective corporate governance mechanisms can 
enhance maximize value, mitigate risk exposure, promote 
operational efficiency and ensure public accountability, few 
works of literature have developed corporate governance 
index to checkmate its effect on firm stability.  
This study primarily examines the effect of corpo-
rate governance structure and firm characteristics on the 
firm financial performance. To unveil the objective of the 
study, two steps are charted. At first, the study constructs 
a corporate governance index for listed financial firms in 
Nigeria by condensing six (6) identified corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. The corporate governance index is 
built using Principal Component Analysis consistent with 
the significant corporate governance proxies identified by 
prior studies (Larcker et al. 2007, Love and Rachinsky 2015, 
Tarchouna et al. 2017a, Zagorchev and Gao 2016). The sec-
ond step then adopts static panel data estimators via OLS, 
fixed and random effect analysis to analyse the influence of 
the built corporate governance index on the performance 
of firms. This study further contributes to prior knowledge 
of these underlined ways. First, to the best knowledge of 
the authors, this study pioneers the construction of con-
densed corporate governance variables using Principal 
Component Analysis in Nigerian corporate governance 
literature. This tends to reconcile the mixed results of the 
influence of corporate governance characteristics on the 
firms’ performance. Finally, our findings will definitely help 
policy-makers to verify the outcome of provisions of the 
Code of Corporate Governance on Firms’ Performance.
Section 2 of this study reviews the previous literature 
and develop our hypothesis. Section 3 of this study stipu-
lates the methodology. Then, the empirical results are re-
ported in Section 4. The findings of the study are discussed 
in Section 5 and then conclude.
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1. Why the emphasis on financial institutions?
Studies have emphasized the differences in corporate go-
vernance for financial institutions from overall corporate 
governance systems. For example, the scope of corporate 
governance for a financial institution is not only limited 
to shareholders but also include debtholder, blockholders, 
insurance policyholders and other creditors (Hopt 2013). 
In addition, financial institutions differ significantly from 
non-financial institutions due to the level of regulations, the 
banks’ capital structure and the complexity of the business 
structure and opacity (Haan and Vlahu 2012, Zagorchev 
and Gao 2015). 
Similarly, agency theory asserts that managers tend to 
have a lower risk appetite compared to shareholders because 
of the short-term benefits of control and undiversifiable hu-
manoid capital investments of the firm (Faleye and Krishnan 
2010). Interestingly in the case of bank bankruptcy, manag-
ers also have the tendency to lose invested wealth in the firm 
(Devriese et al. 2004). Generally, financial institutions are 
more leveraged compared to non-financial institutions in 
which the level of board risk appetite to maximize share-
holders wealth could increase the chance of fiasco. However, 
financial institutions are exposed to various financial risks 
such as credit, interest rate and counterparty risks, which 
reflects their exclusive position as financial intermediar-
ies. Thus, the excessive risk appetite of banks could have 
significant negative externalities on the macroeconomic 
and systemic risk, which encourage a highly regulated 
environment for financial institutions (Haan and Vlahu 
2012, Ojeka et al. 2019). Recently, corporate collapses have 
contributed significantly to the financial market insecurity 
globally, which has triggered diverse regulatory responses 
(Salim et al. 2016).
Notably, financial institutions are characterized to have 
highly information asymmetries and more opacity than 
non-financial firms (Zagorchev and Gao 2015). The authors 
claim that “banks can change the mix and hide the quality 
of their assets rather quickly compared to non-financial 
firms.” This shows the level of insider dealing in financial in-
stitutions leading to agency problems. Interestingly, recent 
legislation and supervision of the institutions tend to allevi-
ate some of the problems. Prior studies affirm the higher 
level of trading assets and banks’ imperviousness during the 
financial predicament compared to the non-crisis period 
(Flannery et al. 2013).
2. Literature review and theoretical framework
This study is anchored on the agency theory. The theory 
affirms that management and owners’ separations exist in 
which the agents᾽ performance could beneath the principal 
expectations. The divergence of managers and shareholders’ 
interest could lead to a possible conflict of interest. The 
existence of the divergence of interest between the prin-
cipals and agents are conceptualized and explored by the 
agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Meckling 
1976). The theory defines the interrelationship between the 
shareholders and management (Waweru 2010), where the 
management activities such as information asymmetries 
and self-interest motivations can exhibit divergence from 
the overall shareholders’ interest (Fama and Jensen 1983). 
In the occurrence of ownership and control separation, the 
shareholders’ transfer decision control to the management, 
which could lead to conflict as the shareholders perceive the 
divergence of their interest with the management actions 
(Khan 2011). In the possible interest discrepancy, share-
holders employ an internal monitory system to induce the 
management to increase the shareholders’ wealth while im-
proving the performance of the firm (Florackis and Ozkan 
2009b). Therefore, deliberate monitory and control system 
is implemented by the shareholders to curb any potential 
problems and compliment the positive performance of the 
management. Presuming the agency costs to eliminate any 
element of conflict of interest at the expense of the share-
holders, agency costs tend to curb agency problem while it 
retrogressively contributes to the performance of the firms 
(Ducassy and Guyot 2017).
2.1. Corporate governance characteristics and  
performance of the firm
Corporate governance structure encourages accountability 
and transparency with the aim to curb agency problem 
where there is the existence of separation between the 
management and shareholders. The corporate governance 
system is channeled towards the actualization of the firm’s 
objectives through supervision and effective management. 
Prior studies have mixed findings on the corporate gover-
nance mechanisms on firm performance.
Zagorchev and Gao (2015) evaluate the extent of risk 
appetite and the performance of financial institutions in the 
United States relative to corporate governance system for 
period 2002–2009. Their results reveal a linear relationship 
between better corporate governance and higher firm val-
ues, while corporate governance is associated with a lower 
level of non-performing loans and higher market value 
(Tobin’s Q). This avers sound governance mechanisms are 
likely to lower the risk appetite of the management, which 
retrogressively has a positive influence on the performance 
of financial institutions that is consistent with the affirma-
tions of Lemmon and Lins (2003), Akhigbe and Martin 
(2008). Salim et al. (2016) provide empirical findings of 
the connotation between corporate governance and the 
Australian banks’ efficiency for the period 1999 and 2013, 
adopting two-stage double-bootstrap data envelopment 
analysis. Their results reveal that major banks are technically 
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efficient more than their regional competitors within the 
time frame of the study. Their findings show a significant 
and positive association of board magnitude and committee 
meetings with bank efficiency. In line with agency theory 
and stewardship theory, the number of independent direc-
tors and board interaction has no significant impact on bank 
technical performance.
Furthermore, Detthamrong et al. (2017) also examine 
the governance mechanism and its influence on perfor-
mance for a panel data sample of 493 firms of non-financial 
firms in Thailand during the period of 2001–2004. The study 
validates that on an average, firm’s corporate governance 
variables such as board size, board independence, audit 
committee size, female directorship, CEO duality, and 
ownership concentration and audit reputation have no 
linear relationship with leverage and firm’s performance. 
Furthermore, Ducassy and Guyot (2017) explore the com-
plexity of ownership structure and corporate governance 
and its influence on firm performance in the French context. 
The study finds that control contestability level is essential 
in comprehending governance mechanisms. 
Madanoglu et al. (2018) defend the perspective that the 
implementation of corporate governance requirements 
does not infer any detrimental effect on financial perfor-
mance focusing on United States restaurant firms. Adopting 
Quantitative Comparative Analysis, the study reveals that 
three prominent governance provisions lead to superior 
financial performance. Paniagua et al. (2018) expands the 
prior studies by exploring the role of ownership and board 
structure on firm performance. The study finds an inverse 
relationship between Return on Equity and board members, 
which implies that a larger board size tends to reduce the 
profitability of the firm. In addition, the study suggests that 
dispersion of ownership has an inverse relationship with 
the Return on Equity, which reiterates that more payout 
reduces the firms’ Return on Equity. To examine the influ-
ence of female directorship on firm performance, Green 
and Homroy (2018) explore whether gender diversity on 
corporate boards has a negative influence on the firm prof-
itability in large European firms. The study finds that the 
influence of female representation on board committees 
is meaningful economically while the effect is modest on 
performance.
Ciftci et al. (2019) explore the importance of corporate 
governance structure on firm performance in the Turkey 
context. The study suggests that intensive ownership 
concentrations often when families are involved tend to 
positively contribute to better firm performance. Thus, the 
family’s ownership tends to bear any risk of poor perfor-
mance. In furtherance of corporate governance structure 
and firm performance, Mertzanisa et al. (2019) incorporate 
the effect of a social institution and firm-specific corporate 
governance and its effect on firm performance in MENA 
countries. The study avers the robust indicators of corporate 
governance such as board size and insider and ownership 
characteristics on firm performance, which identify the 
investors’ awareness of the importance of corporate gov-
ernance and firm performance.
Majority of the studies on corporate governance and 
firm performance explore the different governance char-
acteristics, which could undermine the holistically view 
of the corporate governance structure. In addition, the in-
troduction of diverse corporate governance proxies could 
increase explanatory power but might constitute statisti-
cal inconsistency (Tarchouna et al. 2017a). The statistical 
problems that is multicollinearity issues could occur due 
to complementarily interaction between corporate gov-
ernance measurements (Ameziane Lasfer 2006, Florackis 
2006). Consequently, the complementary relations amidst 
the corporate governance proxies could overload the model, 
which influence its reliability and limit researchers’ conclu-
sion. Thus, the multicollinearity problem is overcome by the 
construction of a single mechanism that depicts the overall 
corporate governance structure, which this study explores.
2.2. Hypotheses developments
Ho1: Overall corporate governance does not contribute to 
Return on Asset in Nigeria.
Ho2: Condensed corporate governance construct does not 
contribute to Return on Equity in Nigeria.
3.  Methodology
3.1. Data 
The study sort data mainly from the annual reports of 
the selected firms. The population of this study consists 
of the fifty-seven (57) listed financial institutions on the 
Nigerian stock exchange. However, the purposive sam-
pling technique is adopted due to the irregularities of some 
firms’ financial statements within the time frame of the 
study. Therefore, this study draws a sample of twenty-four 
(24) financial companies from the listed financial institu-
tions in Nigeria for the period of 2013–2017. The sample 
size consists of twelve (12) Deposit Money Bank, one (1) 
mortgage bank and eleven (11) insurance companies. The 
significance of this period tends towards the post-financial 
crisis of financial institutions globally and Nigeria in which 
appropriate legislation and regulations emerge.
3.2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
This study adopts Principal Component Analysis to cons-
truct the condensed corporate governance indicator as 
to the major explanatory variables. The PCA reduces the 
extent of dimensionality of the loop of corporate gover-
nance measures that is interrelated but retains the most 
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possible variable identified in the data set (Adams and 
Veprauskait 2013, Manuel et al. 2015, Tarchouna et al. 
2017b). Interestingly, a new set of variables that is princi-
pal component is transformed by retaining a few principal 
components in the initial variables depicting the corporate 
governance constructs. Similarly, the benefits of PCA are 
attributed to its functionality to aggregate diverse cons-
tructs of corporate governance into a reduced indicator and 
elimination of multicollinearity that occurs in the instance 
of using diverse corporate governance proxies separately 
in same regression (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). In addi-
tion, PCA attributes weights automatically to individual 
corporate governance proxies.
Notably, the validity of PCA depends on Bartlett’s sphe-
ricity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin statistical test to adopt PCA 
method in this study. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of 
Bartlett’s test assumes the correlation matrix is not factor-
able when linking the identity matrix and correlation matrix 
(Pett et al. 2003). The PCA is appropriate for factor analysis 
when the p-value of Bartlett’s test for sphericity is less than 
0.05 significant level. In addition, the second statistical test 
for PCA that is Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin for sampling adequacy, 
ranging from 0 to 1, and the acceptable benchmark is 0.5 
(Florackis and Ozkan 2009a). Therefore, the statistical out-
come above 0.5 is satisfactorily for the study.
3.3. Panel data estimators
To evaluate the effect of the corporate governance sys-
tem and firms’ characteristics on firm performance, this 
study adopts the static panel estimators namely Ordinary 
Least Method (OLS), Fixed Method and Random Effect 
Method. The OLS model eliminates the panel structure of 
a dataset by pooling together the construct on the variables. 
However, the difference in coefficients is disregarded and 
eliminate possible heterogeneity. Prior studies suggest that 
the underlining assumptions are unrealistic (Detthamrong 
et al. 2017). Meanwhile, fixed effect and random effects 
are more suitable for static time series and cross-section 
dataset. The error term of the fixed effect specification as-
sumes a constant variance over time and serially uncor-
related while the random effect specification controls for 
heterogeneity (Boudriga et al. 2010). Hausman test is then 
applied to select the most suitable estimators between fixed 
and random effects.
3.4. Model specification
This study adopts panel data for the analysis. Panel data is 
generally known as longitudinal or cross-sectional time-
series data, which observe firms’ characteristics across the 
years. To test the formulated hypotheses, which assume 
the consequence of overall corporate governance on the 
performance of the firm are shown in the following eco-
nometric equations:
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 (1)
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Size Age Lev
= β +β +β +β +
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 (2)
The terms are defined in the Appendix. Where subscript 
i presents the firms (I = 1… 24) while the subscript t denotes 
the year (t = 2013…2017).
3.4.1. Dependent variables
The firm performance is measured by the accounting in-
dicators that is Return on Asset while the shareholder-va-
lue based measure that is Return on Equity. The Return 
on Asset is the periodic earnings relative to the total asset 
used to generate operating cash flow. Meanwhile, Return 
on Equity also a profitability measurement denotes the re-
turn on investment by determining the level of efficiency 
the company manage the shareholder funds (Adams and 
Veprauskait 2013).
3.4.2. Independent variable
The central explanatory variable of the study is the conden-
sed corporate governance indicator. This study employs the 
principal component analysis (PCA) to condense six (6) 
corporate governance constructs namely the board magni-
tude, board engagement, board independence, degree of 
share held by directors, board insider and board committee. 
This method then allocates weight to individual corporate 
governance constructs, which eliminate multicollinearity 
problem and produce more reliable constructs than indivi-
dual corporate governance indices (Larcker et al. 2007). The 
board insiders who are simultaneously involved in the daily 
routine of the firms while on the board too. Prior studies 
emphasis on the importance of the executive members, 
which tend to provide expertise skill and encourage better 
communication channel within the management (Ciftci 
et al. 2019). According to Zagorchev and Gao (2015), bo-
ard committee takes the total number of the actuality of 
an audit committee, nomination committee, governance 
committee, and nomination committee. The importance 
of board committee is emphasized by a global code of cor-
porate governance such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
as the existence of the committees depict good governance. 
We expect the overall corporate governance measures to 
mitigate any information asymmetric, conflict of interest 
and promote the shareholders’ values by achieving the ove-
rall objectives of the firm.
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4. Empirical findings
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive figures of both the explai-
ned variables and exploratory variables used in this study 
to describe the trend and spread of the dataset. The table 
accounts for the total observations, the mean, standard de-
viation, minimum and maximum figures for each dataset.
From Table 1, the mean of the ROA is 4.35%, which 
ranges between the minimum values of –25.7% and the 
maximum value of 55.4%. This indicates the level of periodic 
earnings to total asset capable of generating cash flows. The 
standard deviation of 0.0769 indicates that most sampled 
firms maintain an average return on asset. In addition, the 
mean Return of Equity is 14% and its minimum value takes 
–0.58 while the maximum value of 1.428 signifying the ex-
tent at which the shareholder’s fund is employed efficiently. 
In respect to the corporate governance, the mean of 
board magnitude is approximately 12 persons with a maxi-
mum value of 20 persons on the board and minimum of 5 
persons. The degree of an independent director on average 
is 11.2% with none at the minimum and the maximum value 
of 33.3% of the total board magnitude. The firms also have 
on average 4 board committee but 2 board committee at the 
minimum and 7 board committee at the maximum. The 
degree of shares held by the directors is averagely 17%, with 
a minimum value of less than 1% and maximum value tends 
to 100%. In addition, the percentage number of executive 
directors on the board is averagely 28%, with a minimum 
value of 8% and 50% maximum value. The average number 
of board engagement is approximately 6 times with mini-
mum meeting held is 3 and a maximum of 12.
4.2. Condensed corporate governance proxy using 
PCA
This study adopts six corporate governance variables 
identified by prior literature such as Board Magnitude, 
Independent Director, Board Interactions, Director 
Ownership, Board Insider and Board Committee. These 
constructs are condensed into a unique corporate gover-
nance index by PCA. In operationalizing PCA, the study 
selects the first principal component, which represents the 
largest percentage variance in the initial dataset aligning 
with Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009a), Tarchouna et al. (2017a). 
Table 2 presents the outcome of Principal Component 
Analysis for the adopted corporate governance variables. 
The Panel (A) of Table reports the correlation matrix of the 
six corporate governance proxies attributable to the overall 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the used variables (source: authors’ computation)
VARIABLES N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Firm Performance
ROA 120 0.0435 0.0769 –0.257 0.554
ROE 120 0.140 0.232 –0.580 1.428
Corporate Governance
BS 120 11.72 3.883 5 20
BIN 120 0.112 0.0837 0 0.333
BC 120 4.142 1.245 2 7
DOH 120 0.167 0.256 0.0004 0.991
BI 120 0.281 0.114 0.0833 0.500
BM 120 5.517 1.796 3 12
Firms Characteristics
Size 120 18.37 2.121 14.24 21.98
Own 120 0.448 0.308 0.0550 0.999
Lev 120 0.536 0.312 0.00122 0.926
Tan 120 0.0690 0.0967 7.45e-05 0.482
Age 120 1.060 0.447 0 3.305
Note: The variables are defined as follows:  Return on Asset (ROA)  is the ratio of profit before tax to total assets; Return on Equity 
(ROE) is measured as the ratio of profit before tax to equity; Board magnitude (BS) is the total board members; Board Independent 
(BIN) is the ratio of independent director to total board; Board Meeting (BM) is  the number of meetings held yearly; Board Ownership 
(DOH) is the percentage of number of shares held by directors to total shares; Board activeness (BI) is the ratio of executive directors 
to board magnitude; Board Committee (BC) is the number of Board Committees; Firm Tangibility (Tan) is the ratio of total fixed 
assets to total assets; Shareholding (Own) is the ratio of shareholders’ fund to total assets; Firm size (Size) – Natural logarithm of 
total asset; Firm Age (Age) is the natural logarithm of number of years listed; Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
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corporate governance index. The correlation coefficients 
are weak, which depict that the variables capture different 
features of the corporate governance system (Adams and 
Veprauskait 2013, Tarchouna et al. 2017a).  
In addition, Panel (B) indicates the weights of the first 
principal components, which is highly characterized by 
Board Magnitude, Board Insider and Board Committee 
as the absolute value of the factor loading is greater than 
0.5. This signifies the positive contributions to the overall 
corporate governance system. Based on the result of the 
positive contribution of the board magnitude, following 
Dalton et al. (1999), this suggests that large board compo-
sition enables the firm to attract more expertise skills and 
available resources. Furthermore, the Board Committees 
contribute positively to the overall corporate governance 
system, which depicts the essence of board committees as 
Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 2011 prioritizes 
the committees for good governance. Board Insider with 
its positive contribution could suggest bad governance as 
it tends to compromise the board independence following 
the finding of Yermack (1996), Larcker et al. (2007). 
Additionally, Panel (C) of the Table presents the validity 
of the PCA. The null of Bartlett’s test of equal correlation 
matrix with the identity matrix is rejected with a p-value 
of 0.000. This result identifies the linear correlation exists 
between the variables. In addition, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
test reports a statistic approximately 0.6 greater than 0.5, 
which is the benchmark (Florackis and Ozkan 2009a, 
Tarchouna et al. 2017a). This suggests that the condensed 
proxy represents the six (6) adopted corporate governance 
constructs adequately (Stewart 1981). Therefore, the con-
formity with the above statistic test validates the satisfactory 
adoption of PCA in this study. 
4.3. Regression analysis results
This section presents the empirical result of the study re-
garding the overall corporate governance system on finan-
cial performance. Table 3 reports the OLS, fixed effect and 
random effect regression where the explained variable is 
Return on Asset (ROA). However, due to the limitation 
of OLS regression in financial performance studies, the 
emphasis of the study is based on the fixed effect and ran-
dom effect regression.
4.3.1. Effect of condensed corporate governance measure 
on return on asset
Panel A of Table 3 shows the effect of the condensed cor-
porate governance constructs on the Return on Asset for 
the overall sample. Moreover, the fixed effect and random 
effect regression are presented in Panel A, the Hausman test 
suggests that fixed effect regression is more appropriate for 
inference of the result at a p-value of 0.002 with R2 = 0.229. 
This means that encompassing both control variables and 
the constructed index explain 23% of the Return on Asset. 
The result infers that the effect of the condensed corporate 
governance construct is significantly negative on the Return 
on Asset at 0.05 level of significance. In economic magni-
tude, this result suggests that the increase in the condensed 
corporate governance construct will decrease the level of 
Return on Asset in economic magnitude. Better governance 
results in a higher return on asset, nevertheless the results 
indicate that weaker governance of financial institutions in 
Nigeria undermines the accounting profit that is Return 
on Asset. This weak governance can be traced to the weak 
institution saddled with the responsibility to implement 
globally accepted corporate governance measures. This re-
sult is in conformity with the study of Love and Rachinsky 
(2015) in Russia (but not significant).
Table 2. Principal component analysis for adopted corporate governance variables (source: author’s computation)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel (A): Correlation Matrix
1. Board Magnitude 1
2. Independent Director –0.0893 1
3. Board Interactions 0.410*** 0.185* 1
4. Director Ownership –0.168 0.133 0.232* 1
5. Board Insider 0.548*** 0.151 0.493*** –0.131 1
6. Board Committee 0.293** –0.107 0.188* –0.0983 0.142 1
Panel (B): Principal Component Weight
Index 0.557 0.0816 0.309 –0.0617 0.5657 0.5143
Panel (C):  Validity of Principal Component Analysis
Bartlett test of sphericity (p-value) 0.000
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 0.593
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Furthermore, the overall sample is then discomposed 
into two subsamples namely Panel B deals with the Deposit 
Money Banks and Panel C of Table 3 reflects the other fi-
nancial institutions. Similar to the overall sample result, the 
effect of the condensed corporate governance construct on 
the Return on Asset is negative and significant at 0.1 level of 
significance. This result suggests the percentage increase in 
the condensed corporate governance mechanism will lead 
to a decrease in Return on Asset. This reflects also weak gov-
ernance exhibited by the Money Deposit Banks in Nigeria.
Panel C of Table 3 infers the effect of condensed corpo-
rate governance measure on the Return on Asset in other 
financial institutions, which include the mortgage bank 
and the insurance companies. Following the Hausman test 
estimate, the test suggests random effect regression for the 
analysis at a p-value of 0.0740. This result infers a negative 
but not significant effect of the corporate governance index 
on Return on Asset. This result is in conformity with the 
prior study of Love and Rachinsky (2015) in Russia.
4.3.2. Effect of condensed corporate governance measure 
on return on equity
Following the second hypotheses of this study, Table 4 re-
ports the effect of the condensed corporate governance 
mechanism on the Return on Equity. Panel A of Table 4 
reflects the position of the corporate governance index on 
the Return on Equity for the overall sample. The Hausman 
test suggests that the fixed effect regression is appropriate 
at a p-value of 0.0061 with R2 = 0.158. This means that 
encompassing both control variables and the constructed 
Table 3. Empirical result: return on asset as explained variable (source: author’s computation)
Panel A: Overall Sample Panel B: Deposit Money Bank Panel C: Other Financial Institutions 
OLS Fixed Random OLS Fixed Random OLS Fixed Random
Index
–0.0308*** –0.0397** –0.0259** –0.0498*** –0.0255* –0.0371** –0.0189 –0.0413 –0.0174
(0.00914) (0.0162) (0.0120) (0.0163) (0.0147) (0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0260) (0.0197)
Control Variable
Tan
–0.340*** 0.0786 –0.262** 0.869 –4.874*** –0.0351 –0.439*** 0.0929 –0.260*
(0.0700) (0.180) (0.105) (0.556) (1.181) (0.655) (0.0980) (0.217) (0.138)
Own
0.0286 –0.0341 0.00837 0.0581 –0.0400 0.0200
(0.0567) (0.0672) (0.0620) (0.0400) (0.0458) (0.0422)
Size
–0.00140 –0.0857*** –0.00580 0.00353 –0.00820 0.00405 –0.0458** –0.115*** –0.0756***
(0.00442) (0.0190) (0.00647) (0.00385) (0.0367) (0.00516) (0.0202) (0.0248) (0.0215)
Age
–0.0165 –0.00264 –0.0121 –0.0169 –0.114*** –0.0200 –0.0329 0.00476 –0.00202
(0.0159) (0.0207) (0.0186) (0.0214) (0.0348) (0.0248) (0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0260)
Lev
0.0254 0.145 0.00813 0.0619 –0.000835 0.0227 0.0580 –635.3 0.146
(0.0542) (0.153) (0.0646) (0.0397) (0.182) (0.0435) (0.0653) (1,688) (0.0971)
Constant
0.0838 1.552*** 0.173 –0.0661 0.483 –0.0199 0.861** 1.632*** 1.262***
(0.105) (0.337) (0.139) (0.0866) (0.771) (0.108) (0.330) (0.361) (0.344)
Obser-
vations 120 120 120 60 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.268 0.229 0.347 0.435 0.330 0.369
F-test 6.901 4.449 15.28 4.696 5.382 16.19 5.317 4.086 17.33
Prob > F 2.91e-06 0.000549 0.0182 0.000671 0.000338 0.0128 0.000481 0.00257 0.00391
Hausman 
Test 26.7 39.90 5.21
p-value 0.0002 0.0000 0.0740
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. The variables are defined as follows:  Return on Asset (ROA)  is the ratio 
of profit before tax to total assets; Return on Equity (ROE) is measured as the ratio of profit before tax to equity; Board magnitude 
(BS) is the total board members; Board Independent (BIN) is the ratio of independent director to total board; Board Meeting (BM) 
is  the number of meetings held yearly; Board Ownership (DOH) is the percentage of number of shares held by directors to total 
shares; Board activeness (BI) is the ratio of executive directors to board magnitude; Board Committee (BC) is the number of Board 
Committees; Firm Tangibility (Tan) is the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets; Shareholding (Own) is the ratio of shareholders’ 
fund to total assets; Firm size (Size) – Natural logarithm of total asset; Firm Age (Age) is the natural logarithm of number of years 
listed; Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
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index explain 16% of the Return on Equity. The result su-
ggests an insignificant and negative influence of corporate 
governance index on Return on Equity. This result is in-
consistent with the study of Love and Rachinsky (2015) in 
Russia (however, insignificant).
Panel B of Table 4 infers the influence of the corpo-
rate governance index on Return on Equity for the Money 
Deposit Banks. With the report of the Hausman test, the 
random effect is more appropriate for the result inference 
at a p-value of 0.1526. The result, however, suggests a sig-
nificant and negative effect of corporate governance index 
on financial performance (Return on Equity). This result in 
economic magnitude reports an increase in corporate gov-
ernance index will decrease the level of Return on Equity.
Furthermore, Panel C of Table 4 reports the effect of 
condensed corporate governance measure on Return 
on Equity among other financial institutions. With the 
Hausman test result, the random effect regression is more 
appropriate at a p-value of 0.5658. The result suggests a 
negative but not significant effect of condensed corporate 
governance measure on the Return on Equity. This result is 
inconsistent with the study of Love and Rachinsky (2015) 
in Russia (however, insignificant).
5. Discussion of the findings
In building the corporate governance index, six (6) cor-
porate governance mechanisms are condensed using the 
Principal Component Analysis. As mention earlier, the 
corporate governance mechanisms include board magnitu-
de, board engagement, board independence, board insider, 
director ownership and board committees as identified by 
prior studies. The principal component analysis allocates 
weights to individual corporate governance measures in 
Table 4. Empirical result: return on equity as explained variable (source: author’s computation)
Panel A: Overall Sample Panel B: Deposit Money Bank Panel C: Other Financial Institutions 
OLS Fixed Random OLS Fixed Random OLS Fixed Random
Index –0.0818*** –0.0504 –0.0590* –0.0489 –0.0140 –0.0371** –0.0538 –0.0711 –0.0279
(0.0276) (0.0532) (0.0352) (0.0333) (0.0215) (0.0164) (0.0527) (0.101) (0.0648)
Control Variable
Tan –0.850*** –0.0510 –0.717** 0.817 –7.226*** –0.0351 –0.992*** –0.160 –0.774*
(0.211) (0.593) (0.295) (1.136) (1.725) (0.655) (0.327) (0.838) (0.436)
Own –0.0778 –0.244 –0.0892 0.0117 –0.128* 0.0200
(0.171) (0.221) (0.189) (0.0817) (0.0668) (0.0422)
Size –0.00369 –0.232*** –0.0149 –0.00278 –0.0414 0.00405 –0.0829 –0.311*** –0.153**
(0.0133) (0.0626) (0.0182) (0.00787) (0.0536) (0.00516) (0.0674) (0.0961) (0.0744)
Age –0.0243 –0.00926 –0.0246 –0.0205 –0.159*** –0.0200 –0.0710 –0.00257 –0.0260
(0.0480) (0.0682) (0.0558) (0.0438) (0.0508) (0.0248) (0.0874) (0.103) (0.0921)
Lev 0.201 1.273** 0.210 0.190** 0.182 0.0227 0.553** –2,937 0.786***
(0.164) (0.503) (0.192) (0.0811) (0.266) (0.0435) (0.218) (6,538) (0.298)
Constant 0.219 3.839*** 0.417 0.0949 1.267 –0.0199 1.411 2,943 2.409**
(0.317) (1.108) (0.401) (0.177) (1.126) (0.108) (1.101) (6,538) (1.199)
Obser vations 120 120 120 60 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.262 0.158 0.284 0.383 0.293 0.225
F-test 6.691 2.814 17.29 3.509 4.340 16.19 4.477 2.036 12.61
Prob > F 4.42e-06 0.0148 0.00826 0.00537 0.00171 0.0128 0.00174 0.0820 0.0273
Hausman Test 18.05 9.39 1.14
p-value 0.0061 0.1526 0.5658
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. The variables are defined as follows:  Return on Asset (ROA)  is the ratio 
of profit before tax to total assets; Return on Equity (ROE) is measured as the ratio of profit before tax to equity; Board magnitude 
(BS) is the total board members; Board Independent (BIN) is the ratio of independent director to total board; Board Meeting (BM) 
is  the number of meetings held yearly; Board Ownership (DOH) is the percentage of number of shares held by directors to total 
shares; Board activeness (BI) is the ratio of executive directors to board magnitude; Board Committee (BC) is the number of Board 
Committees; Firm Tangibility (Tan) is the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets; Shareholding (Own) is the ratio of shareholders’ 
fund to total assets; Firm size (Size) – Natural logarithm of total asset; Firm Age (Age) is the natural logarithm of number of years 
listed; Leverage (Lev) is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
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which the analysis identifies the positive contribution of 
the board magnitude, Board Insider and Board Committees 
to the overall corporate governance index (see Table 3).  
The findings are summarized henceforth. First, the 
overall corporate governance is associated with firm perfor-
mance. However, the level of association is negative, which 
contrary to the prior studies such as Love and Rachinsky 
(2015) in Ukraine, Zagorchev and Gao (2015) in U.S. fi-
nancial institutions, whose results indicate a significantly 
positive association between corporate governance index 
and firm performance. Better governance expected to re-
sult in a higher return on asset, nevertheless our findings 
indicate that Nigerian financial institutions are character-
ized by weaker governance, which undermines the firms’ 
performance.  This weak governance can be traced to the 
weak institution saddled with the responsibility to imple-
ment globally accepted corporate governance measures, 
which aligns with (Adegbite 2015b).  
Similarly, following the extent of the board magnitude, 
board insider and board committee contribution to the 
overall corporate governance index, this study suggests that 
large board magnitude could undermine the financial per-
formance of the firms. This is consistent with prior studies 
such as Yermack (1996) for 452 U.S large firms; Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells (1998), and Grove et al. (2011) whose 
results reflect the negative relationship of board size with the 
firm performance. These findings propose that the increase 
in board size tends to deteriorate firm performance. This 
implies that a larger board constitutes ineffective communi-
cation channel between the board, poor decision, and diffi-
culty on coordination (Detthamrong et al. 2017). Therefore, 
the ability to restructure the larger board magnitude could 
improve the firm performance. In addition, the extent of 
the contribution of the magnitude of the board commit-
tee is positive following the result of PCA. However, this 
could erode the performance of the firm. In conformity of 
Jiraporn et al. (2009) study, the board committees could be 
restricted to the proponent committee such as audit; risk; 
nominating and remuneration committee instead of an un-
necessary extension. 
Conclusions
The study explores the effect of condensed corporate go-
vernance construct on firm performance while controlling 
for firms’ characteristics in the listed financial institutions 
in Nigeria. This study samples twenty-four (24) listed fi-
nancial institutions in Nigeria. The paper then constructs 
the corporate governance index using six (6) corporate go-
vernance mechanisms with Principal Component Analysis. 
The formulated hypothesis is tested by employing static 
panel data estimators that are Fixed effect and Random 
Effect Regression.  
Prior research especially from developed economies 
provides useful insight on the effect of corporate governance 
index on firm performance. However, the scenario of devel-
oping economies tends to vary as they are surrounded by 
weak institutions. Therefore, this paper examines the level of 
influence of overall corporate governance structure on the 
performance of firms in developing the economy, especially 
in Nigeria, to provide additional insights that could help 
practitioners and regulators.
The results reveal that while controlling for firms’ 
characteristics, constructed corporate governance indi-
cator has a significant and negative influence on the firm 
performance measured by Return on Asset and Return 
on Equity. This finding supports that larger board, larger 
board committees and significant executive involvement 
have a detrimental influence on the performance of firms. 
The result implies a weak corporate governance structure 
is detrimental to higher financial performance amidst the 
weak institutions characterized in Nigeria context. That 
is, weaker corporate governance exhibits lower financial 
performance. Therefore, the key perception of this study is 
that the voluntary corporate governance measures adopted 
by financial institutions are ineffectively characterized by 
a weak environment like Nigeria. However, we believe that 
the adoption of voluntary corporate governance measures 
could be effectively provided the political and legal institu-
tions are effective introgressively.
This study then recommends that the corporate gover-
nance structure in Nigeria listed firms should be review with 
the intention to enhance the firm performance. Further, it 
encourages the regulatory agencies like Central Bank of 
Nigeria, National Insurance Commission, and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, to monitor the compliance of 
the listed firms to good governance behaviour. This study 
encompasses limitations. This study then encourages fu-
ture research to incorporate more corporate governance 
mechanisms in building the corporate governance index 
and extend the number of study time frame.
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APPENDIX: Definition of Variables used in the studies
Variable Code Description Prior studies
Firm 
Performance
Return on Asset ROA The ratio of profit before tax to total assets Detthamrong et al. (2017), Munisi and Randøy (2013), Lasfer (2006)




Magnitude BS The total board members Adams and Veprauskait (2013), Vu and Nguyen (2017)
Independent 
Director BIN
The ratio of independent 
director to total board Ciftci et al. (2019)
Board 
Engagement BM
Number of meetings held 
yearly Adams and Veprauskait (2013)
Director 
Ownership DOH
Percentage of number of 
shares held by directors to 
total shares
García-Meca et al. (2014)
Board Insider BI The ratio of executive directors to board magnitude Bird et al. (2015) 
Board 





Corporate governance Index 
generated by Principal 
Component Analysis
Tarchouna et al. (2017b), Armstrong et al. (2015)
Firms 
Characteristics
Tangibility Tan The ratio of total fixed assets to total assets Huang and Kang (2017a), Detthamrong et al. (2017) 
Capital 
Ownership Own
The ratio of shareholders’ fund 
to total assets Zagorchev and Gao (2015)
Firm size Size Natural logarithm of total asset Munisi and Randøy (2013)
Listed Date Age Natural logarithm of number of years listed Detthamrong et al. (2017), Ararat at al. (2017)
Leverage Lev The ratio of total debt to total assets Munisi and Randøy (2013), Lasfer (2006)
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Notations 
Variables and functions
ROA – The ratio of profit before tax to total assets;
ROE – The ratio of profit before tax to equity;
BS – The total board members;
BIN – The ratio of an independent director to total board
BM – Number of meetings held yearly;
DOH – Percentage of the number of shares held by directors to total shares;
BI – The ratio of executive directors to board magnitude;
BC – Number of Board Committees;
Index – Corporate governance Index generated by Principal Component Analysis
Tan – The ratio of total fixed assets to total assets;
Own – The ratio of shareholders’ fund to total assets;
Size – Natural logarithm of the total asset;
Age – Natural logarithm of the number of years listed;
Lev – The ratio of total debt to total assets.
Abbreviations
PCA – Principle Component Analysis.
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